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BIAS

AS

AFFECTING

CREDIBILITY

BY WILLIAM G. HALE
PROFESSOR OF LAW. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW
DEAN EMERITUS. SCHOOL OF LAW. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

1.

IN GENERAL

It
is
accepted
doctrine
that
the
bias
of
a witness will affect his credibility.
The existence of
bias does not necessarily imply conscious falsehood.
It is quite likely however to shade at least, though
unwittingly,
a witness'
testimony,
the bias
may be in
favor
of
one side
or against
the other.
Granted its
existence
it may be appropriately
taken into
consideration
in weighing the testimony.
Since bias is a state of mind, its existence can
be determined only circumstantially.
These circumstances
may consist of relationships (e.g. that witness is the

father of

the plaintiff) or dealings or

encounters cal-

culated
to develop a prejudice
(e.g.
a fight
with the
party against whom the testimony is given) or conduct,
or utterances.
These designations are only by way of
illustration.
As Mr. Wigmore (Sec. 949) has well said,
"The range of external circumstances from which probable
bias may be inferred is infinite."
Experience tells us
for all practical purposes what those circumstances are
in individual
situations.
Evidence of
bias
is
considered
of such value that the existence of facts, implicit of
it, may be ascertained either by cross-examination or
by extrinsic testimony.
Considerations of auxiliary
policy, such as surprise or collateral issue, have not
been deemed relatively sufficient to limit the method of
proof.
Such differences
as are found in the
various
jurisdictions
do not
go to the fundamental principle
underlying this evidence, but only to a minor element of procedure.
The point at issue is whether a foundation must
be laid for resort to extrinsic testimony, by first makin
appropriate inquiry of the witness as to the facts indica
tive of bias.
The variations of rule in the United States are as
follows:
(i) No foundation is required; (2) A foundation
is required where the alleged evidence of bias consists o

a statement
made by the witness,
following
the analogy
of impeachment by a prior contradictory statement; (3)
In some jurisdictions the rule requiring a foundation
is
extended,
at
least
ostensibly,
to cover cases
where
evidence of
bias
takes
the form of
conduct.
For example, one finds in a few California cases language
like the following:
"Appellant sought to impeach a witness against him b
proof of declarations and conduct tending to show an
unfriendly feeling on the part of the witness toward
appellant. The witness was not asked concerning these
these acts or declarations.
There was therefore no
foundation laid
for the introduction of the impeaching
testimony of third persons and the rule excluding it
was correct. It is necessary to lay the foundation for such
evidence by calling the attention of the main witness
to the alleged acts and declarations and giving him an
opportunity to explain them, as in the case of inconsistent
statements."
It does not appear
(Estate of Bedford, 158 Cal. 145, 147.
what the "acts" were that were presumed to indicate bias.)
In discussing the question whether the rule applied
to impeachment by prior
contradictory
statements
should
on principle
be extended to the field
of
bias,
Mr.
Wigmore (Sec.
953) remarks:
"Under ordinary circumstances it
should be (i.e.
where
the evidence of the bias takes the form of statements).
But the rule requiring such an inquiry before proving
a prior self-contradiction has been pushed so far, and
applied so stiffly
and arbitrarily,
that on the whole
it now does quite as much harm as good.
To import it in
its
present shape into any subject where it does not
strictly
belong by precedent, seems unwise. Were the
rule properly administered, no doubt it should have a
place here also. But the rule, in any case, applies
only to utterances, not to conduct or circumstances
such as an assault or employment."
I agree with Mr. Wigmore that there is merit in
the principle which led the courts, at common law, to
declare that a witness should first have his attention
called to a prior self-contradiction before offering
extrinsic testimony thereto.
The principle is based
not only on considerations of fairness to the witness
in making ample provision for explanation by him, and
on the very practical consideration of possible economy

of time which would be secured if the witness admitted
outright the prior statement, but also it is a principle
which would largely eliminate the evil of unfair surprise as to a collateral issue of fact, since it would
serve as a warning that such issue might be pressed
later through extrinsic testimony.
In meeting Mr. Wigmore's objection to the extension of that principle based upon a too arbitrary handling of it by the courts, it may be sufficient to suggest,
as we approach the task of revamping the California Code,
that we safeguard the general principle against prostitution and thereby justify its extension to both circumstances and statements in the field of bias.
Statements found in court opinions, such as in the
quotation from the Supreme Court of California (supra)
that a foundation must be laid in the case of conduct,
as well as utterances, in.dicative of bias, call for
special consideration.
First it may be asked whether
any of the courts actuaLly have gone beyond a case involving utterances, and second, granting that they have
not, whether the law ought not to be extended even into
the field of conduct and perhaps beyond that.
There is
some uncertainty as to the actual state of the law.
It
arises from possible ambiguity in the use of the word
"act" or "conduct".
For example, at times the evidence
of bias is that the witness attempted to bribe or otherwise improperly influence another witness in the case.
This may be termed an "act".
The evidence offered, however, takes the form of utterances.
The actual inquiry,
therefore, is concerning what was said on a certain occassion.
One may contrast with this, evidence of a
fight between the -witness and the party to the action
against whom he has testified.
And then in still another category may be placed evidence of a relationship
indicati-ve of bias, e.g. that witness is the brother of
the party for whom he is testifying, or an employee of
such party.
In considering the problems here suggested the
Queen's Case, (1820) 2 Brod. P.B. 284, 129 Eng. Reprint,
976, 897, offers a good starting point.
The following
question was proposed to the Judges:
"Whether, according to the practice and usage of the courts
below, and according to law, when a witness in support of a
prosecution has been examined in chief, and has not been
asked on cross-examination as to any declarations made by

him, or acts done by him, to procure persons corruptly to
give evidence in support of the prosecution; it would be
competent to the party accused, to examine witnesses in his
defense, to prove such declarations or acts, without first
calling back such witness examined in chief to be examined
or cross-examined as to the fact, whether he ever made
such declarations or did such acts?"
This question was answered in the negative.
The
English court sees no distinction in principle between
this set-up and that where the impeachment takes the
form of a prior self-contradictory statement.
It gives
as the reasons which support the requirement of inquiry
first on cross-esamination, the following:
(1) The
witness "has an opportunity of giving such reason, explanation, or exculpation of his conduct, if any there
be, as the particular circumstances of the transaction
may happen to furnish, and thus the whole matter is
brought before the court at once, which, in our opinion,
is the most convenient course"; (2) If the opportunity
of explanation is not thus afforded in the first instance, it may be wholly lost "for a witness, who has
been examined, and has no reason to suppose that his
further attendance is requisite, often departs the
Court, and may not be found or brought back until the
trial be at an end.
So that, if evidence of this sort
could be adduced on the sudden and by surprise, without any previous intimation to the witness or to the
party producing him, great injustice might be done to
the
party • . • and one of the great objects of the
course of proceeding established in our Courts is the
prevention of surprise, as far as practicable, upon
any person who may appear therein. "
In discussing the point that the inquiry here
had reference to an "act", the court said:
"Now such acts of corruption are ordinarily accomplished
by words and speeches; an offer of money or other benefit derives its entire character from the purpose for
which it was made, and this purpose is notified and
explained by words; so that an inquiry into the act of
corruption will usually be, both in form and effect, an
inquiry as to the words spoken by the supposed corrupter;
and the words spoken for such a purpose do, in our opinion, fall within the same rule and principle, with regard to the course of proceeding in our courts, as words
spoken for any other purpose; and we do not, therefore,.
perceive any solid distinction with regard to this point

between the declarations and the acts mentioned in the
It will be obvious, that the
question proposed to us.
observations regarding convenience and inconvenience,
to offer to your Lordwhich we have taken the liberty
ships as to the proof of words, are alike applicable to
the proof of acts."
Nice and subtle distinctions.
If the rule demanding a foundational inquiry in a
besound, it
is
on words is
bias
based
solely
case of
lieved that the view of the English judges is sound in
including cases of bias evidenced by conduct plus words.
The practical difficulty of drawing a line between these
two types of cases furnishes an adequate reason for so
formulating the rule that it would be unnecessary to
But it is submitted that there
make the distinction.
is further and more fundamental reason for the extension
One reason often urged for requiring a
of the rule.
foundation in the case of alleged contradictory statements is that utterances are seldom transmitted by the
in
the form
but
rather
exactness
bearer
with absolute
should
have an
and hence the utterer
of
impressions
them
and thus
put
his
statements
to explain
opportunity
Inflection
even can change
their
true
light.
perhaps
in
Tradition has it that in old frontier much
a meaning.
on the
a smile
or absence of
depended upon the presence
when he engaged
conversationalist
of
the 6olorful
part
It would seem to follow
repartee.
in certain
forceful
that
wherever utterances come into the picture, even if
acts also figure in it, the importance of explanation
But this step may logically
may be quite as great.
If the evidence of bias consists only
lead to another.
The fact of bias
of acts, ambiguity may be involved.
An exchange of blows
is an implication from the acts.
Thus the way is
may be a fight or a friendly bout.
paved for including within the rule all cases of conduct indicative of bias, whether accompanied by evidence of
words or not.
Finally it remains to ask whether bias implied
I believe
from relationship falls in the same category.
Whether the witness is a brother or emit does not.
ployee of the party for whom he testifies, calls for no
The only issue here involved is whether
explanation.
The principle, therethe relationship actually exists.
fore, which has been relied on in the foregoing situaNevertheless, may it no-t
tions has no application here.

also be desirable to require a preliminary inquiry of
the witness concerning such matters before undertaking
to call other witnesses thereto?
The law of evidence
in more than one instance emphasizes the evil of surprise.
Neither the witness who is sought thus to be
impeached nor the party who calls him can anticipate
such an issue.
If no inquiry is made of the witness,
during his cross-examination, he may well be dismissed
and may be out of reach when the attack is after made
on him.
Neither he nor anyone else therefore could.be
readily called in rebuttal.
To demand a preliminary
inquiry of the witness, during his cross-examination,
imposes no special hardship on the cross-examiner.
If
the
witness
admits the relationship.
as he may if
it
is true, time is saved.
If he denies it. the inquiry
will have served as a warning to prepare by the calling of other witnesses to sustain him in case the crossexaminer later
follows
up this
attempted
impeachment.
The requirement should not be absolute, but should be
applied subject to a reasonable discretion.
It is recognized, of course, that we here would
be departing from traditional procedures, but we offer
the suggestion as worthy of consideration.
It
is
also
recognized that the principle underlying such extension
carries
beyond the field
of
bias.
It
would include
all
modes of impeachment in which the facts, impeaching in
their
character,
would be within
the knowledge of
the
witness
and which are now open to proof
by extrinsic
testimony - for example that witness was intoxicated
at the time of the event, or that witness had been convicted
of
a crime.
v Fincher,
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Allen
(1914)
187 Ala. 599,
65 So.
946,
while deciding
on the
basis
of
settled
authority
in
that
state
that
evidence
of
bias
could be offered
without
any prior
foundation
inquiry,
nevertheless
gives
strong
moral support
to the
views here
expressed, in the following language:
"As the multiplication of issues is not desirable, it
would seem that the better rule would require the party
against whom a witness is testifying
to develop, on crossexamination, the fact of the bias of the witness.
If,
on
the cross-examination, the witness admits the facts showing his bias, then there should, at once, be an end of the
matter.
If he, on such cross-examination, denies the
facts showing such bias, then the party against whom he
has testified
should be - and in all
courts, including our

own, is - allowed to show by other witnesses the existence
of such facts . . . While for administrative purposes, the
better
rule on the subject is,
in our opinion, the one which
we have above indicated, and while the question is one only
of practice, our predecessors, in the cases above cited,
have declared the rule in this state
to be as we have quoted
it
(viz: that nb preliminary inquiry on cross-examination is
required.)"
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CASES DEALING WITH BIAS, WHICH HAVE
REQUIREMENTS AS TO FOUNDATION.

A BEARING ON

THE

People v Ye Foe,
(1907) 4 Cal. App. 730, 737, 89
?ac. 450.
The State
was allowed to impeach one of
defeniant's witnesses by extrinsic testimony that this witness
iad offered a bribe to one Edgar to give certain testinony. favorable
to the defendant.
It
was objected
that
a
sufficient
foundation
had not
been laid
in
that
the attention
of
the
witness
had not
been called
to "the parties
)resent
at
the time of
the
alleged
bribery
conversation."
In affirming
the trial
court,
the Appellate
Court de3lares:
"The better
course would have been to have called the attention of the witness Jue Doe Men to the persons present at
the alleged conversation, but the omission to do this is not
necessarily fatal to receiving impeaching testimony. The
attention of the witness was called to the circumstances of
time and place, and it
clearly appeared that he understood
the occasion referred to and the conversation to which his
attention was directed.
He gave his version of the conversation and denied that he offered Edgar twenty dollars.
NOTE:
It will be observed that the inquiry related to a
conversation.
It is assumed that a foundation was necessary. The
opinion shows some liberality
in the application of the rule.
People v Delbos, (1905) 146 Cal.
734, 738.
The
3nly statement in the case bearing on the question of
impeachment is
as follows:
"There were other exceptions to the refusal. of some evidence
tending to lay the foundation for proof that the prosecution
was instituted
by the prosecuting witness for the purpose of
extorting money from the defendant.
It was proper to show
this fact to impeach the motives of the prosecuting witness,
but the questions asked should have been preceded by a direct question.
The Prosecuting witness should have been
first asked if she had not begun the prosecution for that

Purpose.

The ruling was technically correct."

NOTE:
Without the entire record in this case
it is difficult to get the import of this language.
to assume that evidence of such motive would consist
statements.
If so the case falls in the "utterance"

before one,
It seems fair
chiefly of
category.

Estate of Bedfore, (1910) 158 Cal. 115, 110 Pac.
302.
This case, also, is short on fact background.
Nothing appears except what is incorporated in the quotation from the opinion which appears (supra) in the
text of this memorandum.
It is there indicated that
"declarations and conduct" were offered as "tending to
show an unfriendly feeling."
It does not appear
whether
the "declarations" and the "conduct" were in
any way inter-related.
The case, therefore, can not
be cited definitely to the proposition that were the
hostile episode consists exclusively of an "act" the
rule calling for a foundation inquiry would be applied.
Hence, quaere as to a case involving "act" only.
Baker v Joseph,
(1860) 16 Cal. 173. 177.
This
case holds that proof of declarations of hostility by
a witness is governed by the rule applicable to impeachment by proof of prior contradictory statements.
The Queen's Case, quoted from (supra) in the text of
this memorandum, is cited and relied upon.
The following discussion of the problem presented is instructive:
"It is said that the Court erred in excluding proof of the
state of feeling of the witnesses Oppenheim and Brooks. On
cross-examination, Oppenheim testified that he had no animosity towards Joseph. He also testified that, 'since the
commencement of this suit,
and at no other time, I never
stated to Mrs. Fox that I would ruin defendant, or words
to that effect! The appellant offered to prove by Fox
that, in conversation with appellant, held about the time
of the commencement of this action, Oppenheim told him he
would ruin the defendant.
Some other testimony of like
import was offered and rejected. The ground of this rejection was the obvious one that the questions were not
directly put to the witness, whether he had made these
statements, and proper information as to time and place,
and the precise matter which was to be used against him
given, so that an opportunity might be afforded to rebut
or explain it. It is unquestionable that where a witness
is sought to be impeached by proof of contradictory statements, made or alleged to have been made by him, it must
be brought to the knowledge of the witness what the

precise matter of these contradictions is,
and the time
and place of making them.
This rule is based upon a principle of justice, which requires that the witness have a
fair
opportunity of explaining what, without such explanation, might appear to be suspicious.
But it is said that
the same rule does not hold in regard to expressions of
hostility
or ill
(178) feeling on the part of the witness.
It is argued that the value and weight of testimony, in
some degree, depend upon the state'of
feeling of a witness;
that a witness, whose feelings are embittered against a
party, is not so worthy of credence as a witness standing
indifferent;
and that, therefore, proof of this state of
unfriendly feeling is admissible, as independent evidence
affecting the testimony of the witness.
This distinction
is more plausible than sound. No mode of ascertaining
the state
of feeling of the witness exists, except that
disclosed by the declarations or the acts of the witness
sought to be impeached by these declarations. The same
principle, which assures to him the privilege of explanation when contradictory declarations are offered, applies
to assure him the right of explanation, when declarations
of hostility
are sought to be introduced.
In effect, it
is attempted to be shown that the witness has asserted,
directly
or impliedly, something different
from the present testimony; that, whereas he professes or holds himself out to be an indifferent and impartial witness;
testifying without prejudice or feeling, yet, really and
in fact, he is a prejudiced witness, whose passions color
his testimony. The weight of authority and the reason of
the rule, are as we have stated them. We can see no distinction between admitting declarations of hostility of
the witness, by way of impairing the force of his testimony, and admitting contradictory statements for the same
purpose, so far as this rule is concerned; for, in either
case, an opportunity should be given the witness to explain what he said.
We understand this
doctrine to be
laid
down by the best standards.
Thus, PH. Ev 2 vol.
435, says:
'The rule that a witness ought to be crossexamined as to contradictory statements, before they can
be admitted in evidence to impeach the credit of his
testimony, has been extended not only to contradictory
statements, but also to other declarations of the witness, and to acts done by him through the medium of
declarations or words; so that, if
it is intended to offer evidence of former declarations of a witness, or of
acts done by him touching the cause, not with a view to
contradict his statement upon oath, but for the purpose
of discrediting him as a corrupt witness, or as one who

would corrupt other witnesses, in this case also, it has
been determined that the witness should be previously
questioned as to them in cross-examination. This appears
from an answer of the Judges to a question put to them by
the House of Lords, (in the Queen 's Case ) in the course
of the proceedings before referred to.
The question was
in the following words:
"If
a witness in support of (179)
a prosecution has been examined in chief, and has not been
asked in cross-examinations as to declarations made by him,
or as to acts done by him, to procure persons corruptly to
give evidence in support of the prosecution, whether it
would be competent to the party accused to examine witness
in his defense, for the purpose of proving such declarations or acts, without first calling back the witness to
be examined or cross-examined as to the fact whether he
ever made such declarations or did such acts?' Another
question was the following:
'If a witness, called on the
part of a plaintiff or prosecutor, gives evidence against
the defendant, and if, after the cross-examination of the
witness by the defendant's counsel, they discover that the
witness so examined has corrupted or endeavored to corrupt
another person to give false testimony in such case;
whether the defendant's counsel may not be permitted to
give evidence of such corrupt act of the witness, without
calling him back?'
The Judges were of opinion, on both
questions, that the proposed proof could not be adduced
without a previous cross-examination of the witness as to
the subject matter, 'The general rule,' says the Lord
Chief Justice, 'and the general practice is this:
If it
be intended to bring the credit of a witness into question, by proof of anything that he may have said or declared touching the cause, the witness is first
asked,
upon cross-examination, whether or not he has said or
declared that that which is intended to be proved.'
(Carpenter v Wall, 11 A. & E. 803; 2 Barb. 211; 121d.
596; 1 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 462.)
This author says that the
rule is extended, not only to contradictory statements
by the witness, but to other declarations, and to acts
done by him through the medium of verbal communications
or correspondence, which are offered with the view to
contradict his testimony in chief, or to prove him a
corrupt witness himself, or to have been guilty of attempting to corrupt others.'
"The offer to introduce the proof of the declarations
of the witnesses, Oppenheim and Brooks, did not meet
the requirements of the rule, as laid
down in the Queen's
Case, and now generally recognized. There was no such

specification of time, place and occasion as to give to
the witness the full opportunity of explanation."
People v Pickens, (1923) 61 Cal. App. 405, 408.
Extrinsic evidence may be offered to show that a witness and a party, for whom he testifies, are members of
the same lodge, without first inquiring on cross-examination as to such fact.
(See following cases
This is dictum in the case.
NOTE:
Silvey v Hodgdon,
in
which the bias was evidenced by statements:
(1874) 48 Cal. 185; People v Gardner, (1897) 98 Cal. 127, 132;
Fagan v Lentz, (1909) 156 Cal. 681; Ash v Soo Sing Lung, (1918)
177Cal. 356, 170 Pac. 843; People v Nelson, (1928) 90 Cal. App.
27, 34, 265 Pac. 366.
The trial
People v Brooks, (1892) 131 N.Y. 321.
court ruled out the following evidence, calculated to
show the bias of a witness for the state against the
defendant, on the ground that the state's witness had
Defendant
not been cross-examined as to the matter.
was on the stand and was questioned by her counsel as
"Now state whether or not Charlotte (the
follows:
witness for the state) was friendly to you or unfriend"Did you and Charlotte have frequent difficulties
ly?"
Did Charlotte assault you upon
during that time?"
other occasions previous to the fire?"
The trial court erred in ruling out this examHELD:
No foundation is required in such a case."
ination.
It does not fall within the principle applicable to
impeachment by prior contradictory statements.
This case is cited with approval in People v
NOTE:
Pickends (supra).
Brink v Stratton, (1903, N.-Y.) 68 N.E. 148.
The defendants allege
Action on a promissory note.
C was called as a witness for the
payment by one C.
Three witnesses testified as to the repudefendant.
C was then called
tation of C for truth and veracity.
as a witness and asked the following questions concerning the witnesses who had testified as to his bad reputation, all of which were objected to and in each case
the objection was sustained.
Was Mr. Boyd opposing you and you opposing
1.
Mr. Boyd for a number of years in your papers?
Each one attacking the other through his
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

HELD:
above

paper?
What have been the relations between you and
Mr. Wilbur?
Was Arthur Wilbur one time superintendent of
schools?
Did your paper attack him?
I will ask you whether or not by reason of
the position of the Forum against Mr. Wilbur,
whether or not he was defeated as superintendent of the schools?

That it
was prejudicial error to exclude the
questions.
The court reasoned as follows:
"That it was competent to prove the hostility of any or
all of these witnesses towards the defendants, or either
of them, by their cross-examination or by other testimony;
that it was not necessary that the witness should be first
examined as to his hostility before calling other witnesses
is not limited to contradicting him in case he denies hostility - is well established by the decisions of this state.
"The extent, however, to which an examination may go for
the purpose of proving the hostility of a witness must be,
to some extent at least, within the discretion of the trial
judge.
It should be direct and positive, and not very remote and uncertain, for the reason that the trial of the
main issue in the case cannot be properly suspended to make
out a case of hostile feeling by mere circumstantial evidence from which such hostility or malice may or may not be
inferred."

N.Y.

People v Mallon,
Supp. 814, 818.

(1906) 116 App.

Div. 425,

101

"The appellant urges that there was reversible error in the
exclusion of testimony showing the hostility of the witness
O'Brien towards the defendant. One Tausig was called by
the defendant and, after testifying to some facts relative
to the shooting, stated that he had known William O'Brien
for six or seven years, and that he remembered seeing him
two nights after the shooting occurred at No. 23 Bowery.
Whereupon this question was asked, 'Did O'Brien at that
time state whether he would tell the truth or tell a lie as
to what happened that morning in reference to Mallon?'
Which question he was not permitted to answer.
The appellant now urges that this question was put to the witness
for the purpose of proving hostility on the part of the
witness O'Brien toward the defendant, and that it was error

to exclude it. O'Brien had not been interrogated while
on the stand in regard to any such occurrence or conversation. The evidence was offered, of course, for the purpose of impeaching O'Brien.
"There are two rules firmly established by the decisions
in this case .

"The second rule is that the hostility of a witness towards a party, against whom he is called, may be proved
by cross-examination of the witness, or witnesses may be
called who can swear to facts showing it.
It would have
been competent, therefore, without previous cross-examination upon the subject, to have proved facts tending to
establish hostile
relations between the witness O'Brien
and the defendant. The question is whether, under this
rule, mere utterances of the witness claimed to show hostility can be proved, without preliminary interrogation
as to those utterances of the witness himself.
The reason for the rule requiring, in the case of mere contradictory statements, that there should be a preliminary
interrogation, is primarily based upon the uncertainty of
hearsay evidence; that when one person undertakes to say,
after
more or less lapse of time, what another person
said, the accuracy of the repetition depends upon the
correct understanding in the first
instance of the statement, its
accurate preservation in the memory of the
testifying witness, its
accurate reproduction upon the
trial, together with the circumstances under which it
was first uttered and its relation to the rest of the
transaction of which it purports to be a part.
With
these numerous chances for misunderstanding, forgetfulness, and misrepresentation, it has always been thought,
in this state
at least,
that it was due, not only to the
convenience of trials
and the interest
of justice,
but
also to the rights of the witness, that he should have
an opportunity of tendering his version of the matter
in the first instance. Therefore preliminary interrogation of a witness as to contradictory utterances has
always been required.
"There does not seem to me to be any reason why the
same rule should not apply to mere utterances claimed
to indicate hostility.
A careful examination of the
cases in this state has -failed to discover the establishment of a contrary rule."

Reference is here made to People v Brooks (supra)
and Brink v Stratton (supra) and it is pointed out that
in neither case was the "question of utterances" involved.
The court concludes that the evidence offered
in the principle
case was properly excluded.
PeoPle v

Lustig,

(1912) 206 N.Y.

162,

171.

"Another of the errors, which I regard as grave, was com-.
mitted in refusing to allow the witness Thomas, called for
the defense, to testify concerning a conversation, which he
had with Mr. and Mrs. Livingston about the defendant. Thomas
testified to having the conversation some time in December,
1909, in the Livingstons' drug store, and was asked to 'tell
the jury what was said in respect to this defendant.' This
question was objected to by the district attorney as immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent. Whereupon, the defendant's counsel stated:
'I desire to show the hostility
of Mr. and Mrs. Livingston.' The court, then, asked 'Did
you question Mrs. Livingston touching this hostility?'
Defendant's counsel replied, 'I did not question her, but
it seems to me that I did not have to.?
The witness was
not allowed to answer and the defendant excepted. Any objection to the form of the question was obviated by reason
of the ground of the exclusion of the evidence. The rule
is settled in this state, by repeated decisions of this
court, that the hostility of a witness towards a party,
against whom he is called, may be proved by any competent
evidence. As it was stated in People v Brooks, (131 N.Y.
321,325), the hostility 'may be shown by cross-examination
of the witness, or witnesses may be called who can swear
to facts showing it. There can be no reason for holding
that the witness must first be examined as to his hostility, and that then, and not till then witnesses may be
called to contradict him.'"
NOTE:
Reliance upon People v Brooks, seems misplaced. In
the Brooks case the evidence of bias consisted of conduct, not
utterances. The Stratton case is also cited. But it likewise
and for the same reason is not in point.
However, the Lustif
case was decided by the Court of Appeals, and would, therefore,
seem to represent the New York law. No reference is made to
People v Mallon. But the HalIon case was decided in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and therefore does not stand
against the Lustig decision.
Sullivan
110.

v

State,

(1932)

25 Ala.

140,

142 So.

The defendant is charged with assault
FACTS:
It appears that he shot one
with a deadly weapon.
As a part of
Moore with a double barrelled shot gun.
his defense S offered to prove that Moore, the prosecuting witness had on the morning of the attack, alleged in the complaint, set fire to defendant's hay
This evidence was offered on two theories.
stack.
(1) That Moore had committed a felony and defendant
was entitled under the statute to use force in arresting Moore, (2) That the evidence tended to show bias
and prejudice on the part of Moore.
That the evidence was inadmissible on both
HELD:
As to the second ground the court states:
grounds.
"That defendant insists that this evidence was relevant
as tending to show the animus and bias of Henry Moore as
a witness. This insistence is untenable. The proper way
to show bias of a witness is to ask him directly the
state of his feelings, and, if he denies bias, to resort
to facts and circumstances tending to show it. In this
case the proper predicate was not laid for the introduction of independent circumstances."
191 Ala. 436,
(1914)
Co.
v Harrison,
Ry.
Southern
an employee
by
sustained
injuries
for
Suit
67 So. 597.
of the defendant Company while riding on an engine of
One Ernest was call.ed
one of the defendant's trains.
The defendant on crossas a witness for the plaintiff.
examination asked him if he had been discharged from the
employ of the defendant company at or near the time of
The plaintiff objected to the question
the accident.
The defendant appeals
and the objection was sustained.
fromtthis ruling.
HELD:
said:

The

evidence was properly

excluded.

The

court

court committed no reversible error in declining
"The trial
to let the defendant ask the witness Ernest, on cross-examination, to state whether or not he was laid off by the
Sourthern Railway Company on the morning of the accident.
The witness had jus-t stated he had not worked for the defendant since that time, and it was therefore immaterial
to the issues involved whether he quit or was laid off by
the company, unless, as is now suggested in brief of counsel,
that the fact he was laid off by the defendant was a circumstance showing ill feeling towards the said defendant,
and was a circumstance affecting his credibility. If this
be true, the purpose or relevancy of the evidence should

court, as there is nothing
have been suggested to the trial
in the question which would show that it was being asked to
show bias on the part of the witness.
Moreover, the more
proper and orderly way to have shown bias or ill will was
to have asked the witness the direct question as to his
state of feelings towards the defendant, and he may have
ad/ritted that it was bad. On the other hand if he said it
was good, then the defendant could resort to the introduction of facts
and circumstances showing that the witness
was biased against the defendant."
Creeping
Bear v State,
(1905)
113 Tenn. 322, 87
S.W.
653.
The defendant
was indicated
for
murder.
W,
a witness
for
the prosecution,
was called
to testify
to
On cross-examination the dethe facts of the murder.
fendant
sought to bring
out
that
W. was a friend
of
the
deceased and that
during
the pendency of
an appeal in
a
former case he had taken an active
part
in
trying
to
keep people
from signing
a petition
seeking
a pardon for
the defendant.
The offer
of
this
proof
was refused
by
the trial court.
The defendant then offered a witness
to testify
to the friendship
and the
conduct of the witness for the prosecution as independent evidence.
This
second offer
of
proof
was again rejected.
Defendant
appeals from a judgment of conviction holding that the
action
of
the trial
court
was error.
HELD:
That. the trial court committed error.
The
court said:
"The testimony should have been admitted. It is always
competent to prove tie friendliness or unfriendliness of
a witness, his partiality
for one party or hostility
to
to the other, in order that the jury may judge of his
credibility and the trustworthiness of his testimony. It
is the experience of trial courts that witnesses are
often as much influenced in testifying by feelings of
friendship or hostility
to parties
to the case as by
direct pecuniary interest in the result of the trial, and
for this reason proof of the relation of the witness to
the parties
may be shown by proving his conduct and expressions in relation to them by cross-examination of the
witness or independently by witnesses called for that purpose.
In the latter
case the best practice is to direct
the adverse witness' attention, where the conversations
and statements are Proposed to be proved, to the time and
place had or are and to whom spoken but this is in the
discretion of the court and not absolutely necessary,
since the evidence is not for the sole purpose of

contradiction.
The answer of the witness on cross-examination is not conclusive, because evidence of his feelings
towards the parties
is relevant and material."

Sasser v

State,

(1907)

129

Ga.

541,

59

S.E.

255.

The defendant
was indicted
for
murder.
A witness
who testified for the state
was asked by defendant's
counsel on cross-examination if he had not had a fight
with the defendant and 'hit at him' in a difficulty
which had occurred between them.
The question was obJected
to and the
trial
court
refused
to allow the
witness
to answer.
HELD:
said:

That

the

trial

court

acted properly.

The court

"The purpose of this testimony was to show the state
of
feeling on the part of the witness toward the defendant.
Cr. Code 1895 provides:
'The state of the witness's
feelings to the parties, and his relationship, may always
be proved for the consideration of the jury.
A party cannot prove a difficulty
between a witness and a party to
the case on trial
to show bad feeling on the part of the
witness toward him, unless the witness denies that such a
feeling exists. Whenever the witness denies that such
feeling exists, it is proper to permit the witness to be
interrogated as to any difficulty or trouble between them,
for the purpose of rebutting this denial and showing that
such feeling does exist.
It does not appear from this
assignment of error that the witness had denied having bad
feeling toward the defendant . . .
If a witness admits
ill
feeling toward a party to a case, he cannot be interrogated as to difficulties
between them in order to show
bad feeling; but, if
a ,witness denies having ill
feeling
toward a party to a case, he.can be interrogated as to
difficulties
between him and said party, in order to show
bad feeling.
A witness can be shown to be friendly with
and entertain good feeling toward a party to a case, and,
should he deny that this is true evidence is admissible
to rebut such denial and show that such friendly state
exists."
Barrdctough
v Union Pac. R. Co.
(1932)
331 Mo.
157. 52 S.W.
(2d) 998.
Action for
wrongful death.
Burke,
the
conductor
of
the defendant
company at
the
time of the accident testified in behalf of the plaintiff.
As a part
of
the defendant's
case the
superintendent
in
charge of
the
section
of
the
road where the

accident occurred was called and was asked the following questions.
After it was shown that Burke had been
discharged from the employ of the defendant company at
the time of the accident.
"Q.
After Mr. Burke was
discharged, did you have any controversy with him about
back pay?
Q.
I am asking if you personally, as superintendent, had any controversy with him about back pay?
Q.
What was the controversy between you and Mr. Burke
about, after you discharged him?"
The witness was required to answer that there was a controversy but he
was not required to answer the other questions.
On appeal it was contended that the questions were proper.
It was contended for defendant that the question
tended to show bias on the part of the witness Burke
and that they should therefore have been allowed.
It was contended for plaintiff that even though
the questions showed bias on the part of Burke they were
improper because Burke had been asked no questions as to
his bias or as to these matters and therefore no proper
foundation for the questions had been laid.
HELD:
That the foundation was not necessary and that
the witness should have been allowed to answer the
questions.
The court said:
"Plaintiff says that Burke was never asked about any such
controversy, and therefore it was an improper attempt at
impeachment without laying any foundation therefor.
It
is true that a witness cannot be impeached, by showing
statements he has made, unless a foundation is laid by
asking him if he made such statements. Here, however,
no statements of Burke were shown, but only the fact that
a controversy about back pay had existed between him and
the company, and defendant was not permitted to show any
details of the controversy. It will further be noted
that the court said that it was sufficient ?to show he
had a controversy' and that plaintiff's counsel agreed.
"There is considerable conflict of authority as to the
necessity of laying a foundation to impeach a witness for
bias or hostility.
'In some jurisdictions, where ordinarily a foundation must be laid to contradict a witness,
his statements or acts which show hostility or bias are
considered of a different character, and no foundation is
required to be laid. In still other states a distinction
is drawn between acts and statements showing hostility or
bias, a foundation being required in the latter instance,

It seems reasonable, however, as
but not in the former.'
stated by Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 343, that the
rule requiring preliminary inquiry of the witness before
offering evidence to show his bias 'applies only to utterances, not to conduct or circumstances, such as an assult
Other illustrations of facts or issue
or an employment.'
of bias without a preliminary inquiry of the witness are:
Relationship to a party by blood or marriage, pendancy of
between the witfiess and the party against whom
litigation
and a quarrel or trouble between them."
he testifies,
The court, however, is of the opinion that the
etc.
of
he quarrel,
as to what the
details
questions
are is not admissible and that the trial court, therefore, acted properly in refusing to allow answers to
the specific questions as to the details of the quarrel
question.
here in
453,
124 Atl.
2.
Brody v Cooper, (1924) 45 R.I.
The suit was for damages sustained to plaintiff's car
The deposition of the insurance adin a collision.
sought
evidence.
The defendant
was offered
in
juster
was
deposition
witness
who gave the
the
to show that
which plainfor
the
company in
adjuster
the
insurance
fact
that
he was
was insured
and to prove by that,
tiff
plaintiff.
in
favor
of
the
biased
HELD:
That in the absence of a proper foundation this
The court said:
testimony was not admissible.
"Granting that defendant can impeach the credibility of
be observed,
the deponent, the rules of evidence must still
The evidence to which objection was taken at most might be
held to show that the witness had a cause for bias; it
does not prove bias in fact and cannot be proved as an
independent fact. Even if it was admissible, the witness
who is to be impeached must first in cross-examination be
interrogated in. regard to it and given an opportunity to
deny bias or explain the extent thereof or the reason
The fact
that in the circumstances the defentherefor.
dent could not cross-examine the witness does not change
the rule."
NOTE:
The case is weakened as to the above point by reason of the fact that the court- holds the defendant unable to imbecause the deposition was taken at the
peach the witness at all
instance and the witness was
defendant's request in the first
therefore the witness of. the defendant.

Ellsworth v

Potter,

(1869)

41 Vt.

685.

"It
is true that a witness who is examined in open court
may not be impeached by proving his declarations out of
court, unless he is first
particularly
inquired of upon
the subject. There is some reason for applying the same
rule to mere proof of ill
feeling which has only been
evinced by unkind or threatening remarks about the party;
but when there has been an open quarrel or a suit at law
between the party and the adverse witness, it becomes a
substantive fact azd may be proved like
relationship, or
interest
in the event of the suit,
without previous inquiry of the witness in regard to it. . . . The proof of
such a difficulty,
law-suit, interest,
or relationship is
not, in the ordinary sense, impeaching testimony, although it may be considered in determining the credit to
be given the witness."

The
stated

Fag en v Lentz,
(1909)
156 Cal.
681, 105 Pac.
951.
facts
and the holding
of
the court
are succinctly
in
the following
excerpts
from the opinion:
"Mrs. Minnie Tucker was a witness for the plaintiff, but
was not questioned and did not give any testimony as to
her feelings toward either of the defendants, or as to
the making of any statement tending to show hostility
or
bias.
On the direct examination of defendant, Charles W.
Lentz, he was asked whether Mrs. Tucker did not, after
some difficulty
between her husband and himself, shake
her hand and fist
at him and say?
'I will give you all
the court you want, before I get through with you.'
An
objection to this question was sustained.
It is settled
in this state
tha't the same foundation as must be laid
for introducing prior contradictory statements of a witness is equally necessary to the introduction of evidence of declarations showing hostility
or ill
feeling
on the part
of the witness, in other words, that before
such evidence is introduced, the witness so sought to
be attacked must be asked as to the making of such statements. . . . The ruling of the trial
court sustaining the
objection to the question asked Mr. Lentz relative to Mrs.
Tucker was in accord with this rule."
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